The Authority of Scientistis

Tonight I came across a blog post that I wrote on LiveJournal back in early 2009, and so I have decided to include it here on this blog as well. (The occasion for writing my thoughts back then I describe in the post itself below.) It deals with a couple aspects of a topic that I still find very much relevant today, that is to say, the misplaced authority (verging on the point of superstition, in fact) given to certain atheistic scientists on subjects that quite clearly fall outside their competence (as scientists) to pronounce upon. In particular, I refer to the faith given to the views of these scientists on the questions of the existence of God as well as the possibility of miracles.

As can very well be imagined, after a decade I have grown much in my learning, most especially after becoming more thoroughly acquainted with Scholastic arguments through the writings of Edward Feser, among others. Back then I was struggling to think through these particular issues for the first time in any great degree, and my writing (both in its substance and its style) reflect that fact. Therefore, no doubt were I writing today, I would certainly change what I wrote below in places. In particular, I would probably omit altogether (or at the least write in a substantially different manner) the section dealing with the existence of miracles as legitimate arguments "for the existence of God". The reasons for that I would like to explain in more detail here.

Arguments for the existence of God, so argue Thomists, can be proven deductively with strict, metaphysical demonstrations. As such, these arguments are infinitely stronger than the (at most) probabilistic arguments of a certain event being a miracle (and consequently legitimate as an argument for the existence of God.) With the latter, it must be remembered that the evidence of any particular event being a miracle by definition always has at least a slight element of uncertainty. However probable it may appear to be a miracle, nevertheless, when speaking from a purely rational viewpoint, it is not, strictly speaking, absolutely certain. Such I acknowledged even a decade ago.

But if that is the case, then one must be prepared for an atheist to pounce on that element of uncertainly. He will likely look for any alternative explanation to any particular event being a miracle (such as, say, the Resurrection of Christ), no matter how implausible his own explanation might seem. He might even admit that he does not know what the real explanation is, but maintain that it is still simply an unknown natural explanation (even accusing his opponent of a "God of the gaps" type of argument, though however legitimate in other contexts, I still think that is a cheap dismissal when used to disguise an inability to adequately address the flaws in his own position, and on a practical level is problematic, for reasons noted in my post below.)

On the other hand, the type of Scholastic arguments alluded to above, proving that God must in principle exist, and also that He can miraculously intervene in His creation if He so chooses, address directly the real questions under debate, and with certain (as distinct from probabilistic) conclusions. That being the case, while what I wrote back then concerning miracles and how they might legitimately be considered as evidence of God's existence might have many legitimate points to keep in mind, (certainly in other contexts), and so I don't want to delete it, I also think now it is also a distraction from what is a much more appropriate approach to the question. After all, why rely on probabilistic arguments when you can rely on strict demonstrations?

That said, whatever flaws my writing back then (not to mention what I wrote above) may contain, it still is something which contains much I still think valuable to express, however amateurishly written. Therefore, I include it below:

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April 25, 2009


Well, one of the things that I am having to do for my English class is write a journal with 10 entries throughout the semester (about 1/2 to 1 page long each, double-spaced), on any topic I wish to choose. I didn't start till Thursday, and the first one I wrote just kept growing, and growing, and growing...(It stands at around 8 pages). That said, I decided to clean it up a little tonight, and include it here. Nobody need read it, of course...I just wish to keep track of it, since I put down some thoughts Thursday that I have been meaning to record.

Anyway, I hope everyone has a good weekend!


I don't know if the following is well thought out, but...just giving some of my thoughts, for what they are worth (since I had to write something for my English class anyway).
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Let me ask you a question. In a debate concerning the scientific aspects of a particular question (between a scientist and a politician), who do you think would be more competent to address the issue? You would think the former, right? After all, politicians may know politics very well (or at least for many of them, the shadier side of politics, if not how to actually help the people they represent...). Yet that experience obviously would not make one competent to authoritatively lecture a scientist on a scientific matter which the latter studies. The politician at best could appeal to other scientists that agree with his position (and thereby make it actually be a debate between scientists). However, if he simply relied on his own knowledge of the matter (assuming, as is likely, he did not have a background in the level and type of science involved in the discussion that the scientist would have), one would naturally be less than confident that he would be right and the scientist wrong (assuming all other factors were equal). Clearly, in this matter, the politician would be acting outside of his field of expertise. It is theoretically possible, of course, that he may have stumbled across the truth of a scientific matter that has escaped scientists, but one would not bet on it. It is also true that the scientist himself is a human being and not completely dispassionate, and therefore, he can be affected by outside factors that are not scientific in character when it comes to a scientific question; scientists are not infallible by any means. Ultimately, an argument has to be judged on its own merits, and not on the merits of the one who is making it, in order for one to be fairly certain in the matter (if such is possible). Yet, if we are forced to rely on another’s judgments (as we inevitably are on a million questions), a politician would not be the first person we would look to for an answer to a scientific question.

Now, this would seem clear to most people. When I state that because a person is competent in one field, that does not thereby necessarily make him competent in an unrelated field, I am simply stating the obvious, right? Yet sometimes I wonder how obvious it is. In the past, I have at times seen some people make the statement that most scientists do not believe in God. It is stated authoritatively, as if this was somehow a silver bullet to show religion to be false. Now, I do not know enough to be able to state whether the claim is true. Admittedly, I am ignorant on many such matters. That said, let us assume it to be true, for the sake of argument. Why does it matter what most scientists believe on this question? The question of whether or not God exists is not a scientific matter. After all, these same scientists (and often the people who appeal to them) would be the first to object to the claims that God can be “scientifically proven” to exist (even in the abstract). Yet if this position is valid, the only way it can be valid is if the topic of God’s existence is not a scientific one in the first place, and a different type of question (i.e., a philosophical one). Science may play a role in evaluating supporting arguments for His existence (for instance, in determining whether or not there is a scientific explanation for certain alleged miracles). However, that does not deal with the main issue, which is one of philosophy. (This main issue is being restricted to philosophy throughout this entry since it deals with natural revelation). Needless to say, one competent in science is not thereby necessarily competent in philosophy; they are different fields.

Another factor as well to keep in mind is that a scientist, in spite of the above, nevertheless might possess a philosophy that can warp his judgment even in those fields that science does have a legitimate role in investigating: for instance, the topic that I just mentioned, miracles. Of course, a scientist cannot and should not ever state that a miracle has been “scientifically” proven to have happened; at the most all he can say is that our present scientific knowledge cannot explain such an event. If he were to go further, he would not be speaking as a scientist at that point. Unfortunately, though, some scientists go to the other extreme of saying that miracles cannot happen. Once they do that, however, they cease to speak as scientists as well, since the question of whether the miraculous is possible is a philosophical question, not a scientific one. As G.K. Chesterton wrote:

The rest is all cant and repetition and arguing in a circle; all the baseless dogmatism about science forbidding men to believe in miracles; as if science could forbid men to believe in something which science does not profess to investigate. Science is the study of the admitted laws of existence; it cannot prove a universal negative about whether those laws could ever be suspended by something admittedly above them. It is as if we were to say that a lawyer was so deeply learned in the American Constitution that he knew there could never be a revolution in America. Or it is as if a man were to say he was so close a student of the text of Hamlet that he was authorised to deny that an actor had dropped the skull and bolted when the theatre caught fire. The constitution follows a certain course, so long as it is there to follow it; the play follows a certain course, so long as it is being played; the visible order of nature follows a certain course if there is nothing behind it to stop it. But that fact throws no sort of light on whether there is anything behind it to stop it. That is a question of philosophy or metaphysics and not of material science.

He is right. The only way one could object to his argument is if it was logically impossible for an event to occur that does not follow the normal “laws of nature” (i.e., a miracle). This is because insofar as an alleged event contradicts the laws of logic, then  it would be false. However, simply not following the normal “laws of nature” is not the same as contradicting the laws of logic. Martin Gardner, in his book Great Essays in Science, observed in his introduction to a selection (which he titled “The Logic of Elfland”) excerpted from another book by Chesterton (Orthodoxy):

...Chesterton's topic is nothing less than the fundamental contrast between deductive logic, true of all possible worlds, and inductive logic, capable only of telling us how we may reasonably expect this world to behave. Let us hasten to add that Chesterton's analysis is in full agreement with the views of modern logicians. Perhaps his "test of the imagination" is not strictly accurate- who can "imagine" the four-dimensional constructions of relativity?- but in essence his position is unassailable. Logical and mathematical statements are true by definition. They are "empty tautologies," to use a current phrase, like the impressive maxim that there are always six eggs in half a dozen. Nature, on the other hand, is under no similar constraints. Fortunately, her "weird repetitions,'" as G.K. calls them, often conform to surprisingly low-order equations. But as Hume and others before Hume made clear, there is no logical reason why she should behave so politely (95). [bold emphasis mine]

Why then do some scientists confidently declare that miracles cannot happen, even in the abstract? It appears that it is simply because they have embraced a philosophy that denies there is Someone “admittedly above” the laws of nature. That being the case, if a believer states that God performed a miracle as an argument (though not strictly a “proof”, for the reason mentioned earlier) that God exists, such a scientist states that such an event cannot be a miracle because miracles “cannot” happen. Therefore, an alleged miracle is not a good argument for believing in God. Yet notice how his argument proceeds. His conclusion is that there is no God. How does he know this? He knows this because any alleged miracle cannot truly be a miracle that could possibly be an argument for God’s existence; we need not even study the evidence for or against its miraculous nature, since miracles are impossible. How does he know miracles are impossible (even in the abstract)? The only way he could know is if there is no God in order to perform the miracle. In short, he has to assume from the beginning that there is no God in order to refute that particular argument in support of God’s existence. In other words, he is engaging in circular reasoning.

Now, it is true that he could also argue while we may not be able to account for how an event occurred at the present, we will be able to in the future, and therefore no miracle has taken place. He may therefore believe he need not present any other argument. If he does this, however, he is simply dogmatizing. That is obviously blind faith. How could he possibly know that? If he had simply restricted himself to stating that it is possible for such to occur, he would be right, of course. As I stated earlier, science cannot “prove” a miracle to have taken place because of that very possibility, and so one cannot scientifically “prove” (in the strict sense) the existence of God on that basis. The argument from miracles is only meant to show that there is a good reason to believe God  exists, since miracles cannot (by themselves) conclusively demonstrate that God exists, due to the fact in the future it may be shown that such alleged miracles can actually be explained scientifically. Analogously, it is possible that all of the present evidence makes a person look guilty as sin for a particular crime, yet at some future date evidence will appear that exonerates him. We recognize that to be possible. Yet notice that, after a trial has occurred (and assuming it was a fair trial, with adequate legal representation for the defendant, and so forth), if it appears to be a “slam dunk” that the person is guilty, we have no problem stating he is guilty. If at some future date evidence comes along that could change our perspective, we will examine it then. In the meantime, however, we treat him appropriately, and would be quite reasonable. Certainly, if we are impartial, we do not confidently declare that evidence will appear in the future that will clear his name. If we did, and decided to release the criminal because of such a possibility, that would not be judged “reasonable” by most people. Similarly, the argument from miracles is only used as a good reason to believe in God's existence. I think for the reason just explained it is a very good argument, but I believe philosophical arguments (such as those presented by Thomists, for instance) are better since they are more certain.

Anyway, to get back to the subject, one may wonder: why would a scientist be tempted to embrace such a philosophy that miracles cannot happen even in the abstract (though such a position is so problematic)? I can only guess, but one possibility I believe would be the following. Precisely because he is a scientist, then as a scientist, he proceeds as if natural explanations can account for events. This is quite appropriate for him in his role as a scientist, since normally natural explanations do explain events. (In fact, that has to be the case for miracles to take place, since a miracle by definition is an exception to what usually occurs in relation to the "laws of nature"). His problem, unfortunately, is that if an event occurs that he cannot explain, then he is left with two options. He can recognize that science no longer is an appropriate tool to come to the truth of the matter, and leaves the question to another field. Otherwise, he can engage in sleight of hand, and dogmatize that “science” has proven that miracles cannot occur, and therefore a natural explanation must account for the event, even if we do not know what it is yet. However, in the latter case, he has simply stated his philosophy, and falsely called it “science”. Yet no matter if you call it “science” or not, the truth is it is still his philosophy instead. Unfortunately,there are scientists that are tempted to the latter course, perhaps because they are scientists, and therefore feel science (which has explained so many things) can therefore explain everything. Basically, it appears to me to be something along the lines of “when your only tool is a hammer, then every problem is a nail.” When your field of expertise is science, then you might be tempted to approach everything as if it can be explained by science, even though, when one thinks about it, there is no particular reason to believe such to be the case. However, if you believe that anyway, then you may feel that there is no need to believe in God (though, in fact, you are in reality relying on philosophical assumptions that are untenable or at least highly questionable, such as that science by its nature can explain everything and the abstract impossibility of miracles. You do not even engage in arguments for the existence of God on the philosophical level, where the argument actually belongs, and rely instead only on the problematic philosophical assumptions mentioned above.). I don't know if that is why some scientists believe in the abstract impossibility of miracles and deny God; it is only a hypothesis (one that I recognize may very well be wrong). But I do still believe that whatever the reason or reasons are, they do face the problems I mentioned above. 

What is my point of this entry then? Is it that scientists have no right to speculate on whether or not God exists? Of course, not. Needless to say, such a subject is by its very nature one that we must all confront. It does not matter what our background. Rather, I am simply arguing against the idea that if most scientists disbelieve in God, that is somehow a good argument against His existence. It is exactly like saying that if most plumbers disbelieve in evolution, therefore evolution did not occur. Now, no matter where one stands on the issue of evolution, I think it likely that most people (for or against evolution) would naturally wonder what particularly qualifies plumbers, as plumbers, to be experts on that question. Similarly, one naturally wonders what qualifies scientists, as scientists, to be experts on the philosophical question of God’s existence (or of the possibility of miracles). Scientists are no more likely than a plumber to be able to come to the correct conclusion on that question (all other factors being equal) since that does not fall within the field they study.

Even among those who are more qualified to speculate on the evidence for or against God’s existence, majority rule does not equal the truth, of course. A minority position can be right, as shown by the fact that minority positions in all disciplines have been shown to be right in multiple cases throughout history. Similarly, even one who is not qualified in the field at all has the right to come to his own conclusions on the matter, based on the evidence the experts give. (After all, that is what I myself am doing, so I'm hardly going to argue against that position). As I stated earlier, the validity of an argument ultimately rests on its own merits, not the merits of the one who argues it (or on the basis of how many people, even among the experts, who agree with it). But it is also obvious that if even the majority postion of those who do have more background in area can be wrong, how much more so is it possible for those who are not so qualified? Thus, if  one points to the fact (assuming it is true) that “most” scientists do not believe in God as an argument against his existence, I can only ask in reply: how is it relevant to the debate what the majority of people in one field think about something that is admittedly not in their field? 

Works Cited

Chesterton, G.K. The Thing: Why I am a Catholic. 23 Apr. 2009

<http://www.cse.dmu.ac.uk/~mward/gkc/books/The_Thing.txt>.

Gardner, Martin. Great Essays in Science. Buffalo: Prometheus, 1984